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USING OLD IDEAS TO CATCH NEW INFRINGERS: HOW
COURTS SHOULD LOOK TO PATENT LAW TO APPLY
LIABILITY FOR INDUCING INFRINGEMENT
Cristin Keegan∗
I.

INTRODUCTION

As of July 22, 2004, almost one billion illegal downloads occurred every month, and over ninety-seven percent of files shared
1
over peer-to-peer networks were shared illegally. On June 27, 2005,
the United States Supreme Court created liability for inducing infringement of a copyright, a step many hope will help halt this Inter2
net piracy. Mass peer-to-peer file-sharing began with Napster, a net3
work that enabled users to directly swap music files over the Internet.
As the number of Napster users increased, the network began to
4
negatively impact record sales. The music industry took action by filing suit against Napster, and the Ninth Circuit eventually held Nap5
ster liable for contributory and vicarious copyright infringement. In
June 2002, Napster filed for bankruptcy and, although the Napster
name remains, the company that started peer-to-peer file-sharing no
∗

J.D. Candidate, May 2006, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A. (English),
2001, Providence College.
1
See Protecting Innovation and Art While Preventing Piracy: Hearings on S. 2560 Before
the S. Judiciary Comm., 108th Cong. (2004) [hereinafter Hearings], available at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=1276&wit_id=3753 (testimony of Mr.
Mitch Bainwol, Chairman and CEO of the Recording Industry Association of America); but see Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Fair Use and Market Failure: Sony Revisited, 82 B.U. L.
REV. 975, 1023–29 (2002) (discussing file-sharing as a fair use and therefore, not illegal).
2
See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. (Grokster III), 125 S. Ct.
2764, 2770 (2005).
3
Michael W. Carroll, Disruptive Technology and Common Law Lawmaking: A Brief
Analysis of A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 9 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 5, 12 (2002).
4
Id. at 13; but see Felix Oberholzer-Gee & Koleman Strumpf, The Effect of File
Sharing on Record Sales: An Empirical Analysis 1 (Dec. 2004) (unpublished manuscript, http://www.unc.edu/~cigar/papers/FileSharing_March2004.pdf) (claiming
that peer-to-peer file-sharing is having almost no effect on record sales).
5
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. (Napster II), 239 F.3d 1004, 1022, 1024 (9th
Cir. 2001); see also infra notes 76–89 and accompanying text.
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longer exists. Shutting down Napster was a major victory for the entertainment industry, but, by that time, peer-to-peer file-sharing was
7
prospering, and the music industry was already losing money.
The Ninth Circuit established in A&M Records, Inc. v Napster,
8
Inc. that operators of peer-to-peer file-sharing networks could be
9
held liable for copyright infringement under theories of contribu10
tory and vicarious liability. After the fall of Napster, other peer-topeer file-sharing network operators tried to structure their networks
11
in a way that they thought insulated them from liability. This attempt appeared successful after the United States District Court for
the Central District of California, in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc.
12
v. Grokster, Ltd., held that Grokster and StreamCast, which operated
networks with less operator control over their respective users than
Napster, could not be held liable as contributory or vicarious infring13
ers. The Ninth Circuit later affirmed the district court’s decision in
14
While waiting for the Supreme Court’s decision on
Grokster.
whether or not to grant certiorari in Grokster, and with the current
doctrines of secondary copyright infringement seeming ineffective in
combating the mass infringement that occurred daily across peer-to15
peer networks, the entertainment industry sought a new remedy.
16
At the urging of copyright owners, several senators introduced
17
the “Inducing Infringement of Copyright Act of 2004.” This bill
6

Chuck Squatriglia, Napster History Sold for a Song: Scores Attend, Hundreds Log on
to Bankruptcy Auction in Santa Clara, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 12, 2002, at A25, available at
http://sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2002/12/12/BA71576.DTL.
The
name Napster still exists because Roxio, a digital media company, bought it. Id.
7
Carroll, supra note 3, at 13.
8
Napster II, 239 F.3d 1004.
9
A plaintiff alleging copyright infringement must establish two elements: “(1)
ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of constituent elements of the work
that are original.” MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§13.01 (64th ed. 2004).
10
Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1022, 1024; see also infra Part II.C.
11
See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. (Grokster I), 259 F.
Supp. 2d 1029, 1046 (C.D. Cal. 2003), aff’d, 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004), vacated,
125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005); see also infra Part II.D (explaining that the structure of newer
peer-to-peer technology prevents the company from maintaining control, which is a
necessary component for finding liability).
12
Grokster I, 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029.
13
Id. at 1031.
14
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd. (Grokster II), 380 F.3d 1154,
1157 (9th Cir. 2004), vacated, 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005).
15
See infra Part II.E (discussing the Inducing Infringement of Copyright Act of
2004, which could broaden secondary liability for copyright infringement).
16
Marilyn Geewax, Tech, Electronics Firms Fear Copyright Bill Could Target Them, COX
NEWS SERVICE, Sept. 29, 2004, available at LEXIS, News Library.
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would have made it possible to hold anyone who induces the in18
fringement of a copyright liable as an infringer. The bill, based
19
upon the section of the Patent Act dealing with inducing infringe20
ment, was specifically intended to prevent peer-to-peer file-sharing
21
networks from profiting from infringement. The session of Congress ended without any further action on the bill, and it was never
22
reintroduced. On June 27, 2005, the Supreme Court adopted the
idea of applying the patent law concept of inducing infringement to
copyright law when it published its opinion on Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer
23
Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. A unanimous Court concluded that a distributor
of a product that enables another party to infringe a copyright could
be liable for the infringement of that copyright under the theory of
24
inducing infringement.
This Comment addresses the Supreme Court’s decision in Grokster and how the lower courts should apply it. Part II of this Comment
discusses the history of secondary liability in copyright law and how
the legislature and judiciary have dealt with innovation. Part III focuses upon the concerns arising out of the Supreme Court’s decision.
Part IV examines how an interpretation of this decision in light of established principles in patent law ameliorate the concerns and apparent uncertainties caused by the decision.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Copyright and Patent Law
Federal copyright and patent laws are based on Article 1, Section
25
8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution. Copyright law protects “original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of
expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly
17

S. 2560, 108th Cong. (2004).
Id.
19
Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 271(b)–(c) (2000).
20
Hearings, supra note 1 (statement of Senator Patrick Leahy), available at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=1276&wit_id=2629.
21
See David Kassabian, Bill Proposed to Strengthen Copyright Laws, DAILY TEXAN, Aug.
2, 2004, available at LEXIS, News Library, University Wire File.
22
Art Brodsky, Induce Act Blog, http://techlawadvisor.com/induce/2004/10/
induce-dead.html (Oct. 7, 2004).
23
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. (Grokster III), 125 S. Ct.
2764 (2005).
24
Id. at 2780.
25
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
18
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26

or with the aid of a machine or device.” Patent law protects “any
new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of
27
matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof,” for which a
patent has been issued.
i.

Direct Infringement

Both copyright and patent law provide protection to owners
from infringement by others. A copyright is directly infringed when
another party violates any of the copyright owner’s exclusive rights to
reproduce, prepare a derivative work, distribute copies, display publicly, perform publicly, or perform publicly by means of a digital au28
dio transmission.
Direct infringement of a patent occurs when
“whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the United
States any patented invention during the term of the patent there29
for.” Both copyright owners and patent owners can protect them30
selves by suing the alleged infringer; however, patent cases may only
31
be appealed in the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, whereas
32
copyright cases can be appealed in any circuit.
ii.

Secondary Liability for Infringement

Prior to Grokster, two forms of secondary liability for infringement existed in copyright law: vicarious liability and contributory li26

17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000).
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
28
17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
29
35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000).
30
DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 20.01 (101st ed. 2005); NIMMER &
NIMMER, supra note 9, at § 12.02.
31
28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2000).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall have
exclusive jurisdiction . . . of an appeal from a final decision of a district
court of the United States, the United States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone, the District of Guam, the District Court of the
Virgin Islands, or the District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands,
if the jurisdiction of that court was based, in whole or in part on section 1338 of this title, except that a case involving a claim arising under
any Act of Congress relating to copyrights, exclusive rights in mask
works, or trademarks and no other claims under section 1338(a) shall
be governed by sections 1291, 1292, and 1294 of this title.
Id.
28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2000) states: “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents, plant
variety protection, copyrights and trademarks. Such jurisdiction shall be exclusive of
the courts of the states in patent, plant variety protection and copyright cases.”
32
28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2000).
27
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34

ability. Although the Copyright Act is quite extensive, there are no
35
statutory provisions that relate to secondary liability. While vicarious
and contributory liability are different forms of secondary liability,
36
both require a finding of direct infringement by a third party.
Vicarious liability is a creature of the common law, derived from
37
the principles of respondeat superior. The Second Circuit first applied the current concept of vicarious liability in Shapiro, Bernstein &
38
Co., Inc. v. H.L. Green Co., Inc., as a means of holding the owner of a
chain of department stores liable for the sale of counterfeit records
39
by a concessionaire. The Second Circuit reiterated the test established in Shapiro, in Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Man40
agement, Inc., holding that an individual is vicariously liable for copyright infringement by a third party “if he has the right and ability to
supervise the infringing activity and also has a direct financial interest
41
in such activities.” Every circuit has adopted this test as a means of
42
determining when a party can be held vicariously liable.
The other means of allocating secondary liability for infringe43
ment of copyrights is contributory liability. Contributory liability,
33

NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 9, §12.04[A].
17 U.S.C. §§ 101–1332 (2000).
35
NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 9, §12.04[A].
36
Id. § 12.04[A][3][a].
37
See Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 261–62 (9th Cir. 1996).
In Fonovisa, the court imposed secondary liability against the owners of a swap meet
for the infringements of both copyrights and trademarks. Id. at 260. The case provides a clear example of the applications of both vicarious and contributory liabilities. Id. at 261. Respondeat superior is defined as “[t]he doctrine holding an employer or principal liable for the employee’s or agent’s wrongful acts committed
within the scope of the employment or agency.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1338 (8th
ed. 2004).
38
316 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1963).
39
Id. at 305.
40
443 F.2d 1159 (2d Cir. 1971).
41
Id. at 1162.
42
See, e.g., Gordon v. Nextel Commc’ns, 345 F.3d 922, 925 (6th Cir. 2003); Nelson-Salabes, Inc. v. Morningside Dev., LLC, 284 F.3d 505, 513 (4th Cir. 2002); Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 262; RCA/Ariola Int’l, Inc. v. Thomas & Grayston Co., 845 F.2d 773,
781 (8th Cir. 1988); Gershwin, 443 F.2d at 1162; Goes Litho. Co. v. Banta Corp., 26 F.
Supp. 2d 1042, 1045 (N.D. Ill. 1998); Polygram Int’l Publ’g, Inc. v. Nevada/TIG, Inc.,
855 F. Supp. 1314, 1324 (D. Mass. 1994); Songmaker v. Forward of Kan., Inc., No. 904156-SAC, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4392, at *16 (D. Kan. Mar. 5, 1993); Chi-Boy Music
v. Towne Tavern, Inc., 779 F. Supp. 527, 530 (E.D. Ala. 1991); A & N Music Corp. v.
Venezia, 733 F. Supp. 955, 957 (E.D. Pa. 1990); Golden Torch Music Corp. v.
Lichelle’s, Inc., No. W-86-CA-005, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7634, at *8 (W.D. Tex. Jan.
26, 1987). For a more complete history of the inception of vicarious liability in copyright law, see Polygram, 855 F. Supp. at 1324–28.
43
NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 9, § 12.04[A].
34
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like vicarious liability, is not statutory, but has its roots in tort law.
The Second Circuit established the idea that “one who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes, or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another, may be held liable as a
45
‘contributory’ infringer.” This test for contributory infringement is
46
used in all the circuits.
Patent law has two statutory provisions concerning secondary li47
ability for infringement. The Patent Act of 1952 codified the common law concept of contributory infringement and divided it into
two categories: contributory infringement and inducing infringe48
ment. Section 271(c) of the Patent Act covers contributory infringement and states:
Whoever offers to sell or sells within the United States or imports
into the United States a component of a patented machine,
manufacture, combination or composition, or a material or apparatus for use in practicing a patented process, constituting a material part of the invention, knowing the same to be especially
made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of such
patent, and not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use, shall be liable as a con49
tributory infringer.

The other provision, § 271(b), governs inducement of infringement
of a patent and states “whoever actively induces infringement of a
50
patent shall be liable as an infringer.”

44

Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 264.
Gershwin, 443 F.2d at 1162.
46
See, e.g., Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Rhyme Syndicate Music, 376 F.3d 615, 621
(6th Cir. 2004); CoStar Group, Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 550 (4th Cir.
2004); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. (Napster II), 239 F.3d 1004, 1019 (9th Cir.
2001); Casella v. Morris, 820 F.2d 362, 365 (11th Cir. 1987); Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Redd Horne, Inc., 749 F.2d 154, 160 (3d Cir. 1984); Harris v. Thomas,
No. 02-0518, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23103, at *7 (E.D. La. Nov. 12, 2004); Microsoft
Corp. v. V3 Solutions, Inc., No. 01 C 4693, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15008, at *39 (N.D.
Ill. Aug. 27, 2003); Polygram, 855 F. Supp. at 1333; Feder v. Videotrip Corp., 697 F.
Supp. 1165, 1177 (D. Colo. 1988); Johnson v. Salomon, No. 4-73 Civ 536, 1977 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 15735, at *105 (D. Minn. May 25, 1977).
47
35 U.S.C. § 271(b)–(c) (2000).
48
Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1469 (Fed. Cir.
1990).
49
35 U.S.C. § 271(c).
50
Id. § 271(b).
45
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B. The Sony Decision
51

In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., a major
1984 decision regarding copyright infringement and new technology,
52
the Supreme Court clarified the application of secondary liability.
The Court addressed whether or not Sony, the manufacturer of Betamax Video Tape Recorders (VTRs), could be held secondarily li53
able for infringement committed by its users. In the late 1970s,
Sony invented VTRs which allowed consumers to transfer current
54
television programming onto videotape. Some of the owners of the
programs that were recorded felt their copyrights were being in55
fringed. These owners brought suit against Sony in an attempt to
enjoin any further manufacturing or marketing of the product, and
56
to obtain damages. Since Sony itself was not infringing any copyrights, the action was brought under the theory of secondary liabil57
ity. The United States District Court for the Central District of Cali58
fornia denied the plaintiffs any relief, but the Ninth Circuit reversed
59
this decision and held Sony liable as a contributory infringer. The
Supreme Court granted certiorari and overturned the decision of the
60
Ninth Circuit.
The Supreme Court only addressed the theory of contributory
61
62
infringement, under which the Ninth Circuit found Sony liable.
The Supreme Court observed that the only way it could hold Sony liable was if “they [had] sold equipment with constructive knowledge
of the fact that their customers may use that equipment to make un63
authorized copies of copyrighted material.” No precedent for this
64
existed in copyright law. Since there is a relationship between copy65
right law and patent law the Supreme Court looked to patent law,

51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

464 U.S. 417 (1984).
Id. at 442.
Id. at 420.
Id. at 422.
Id. at 420.
Id.
Sony, 464 U.S. at 419.
Id.
Id. at 420, 456.
Id. at 456.
See id. at 436.
Id. at 420.
Sony, 464 U.S. at 439.
Id.
Id.
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which statutorily addressed contributory negligence. In 35 U.S.C. §
271(c), the portion of the Patent Code dedicated to contributory in67
fringement, the Supreme Court extracted the concept that “sale of a
‘staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial
68
noninfringing use’ is not contributory infringement.” The Supreme
Court acknowledged that there are many differences between the
Patent Code and the laws of Copyright but the Supreme Court held
that “the staple article of commerce doctrine,” embodied in 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(c) serves an important purpose in patent law and could serve
69
an equally as important purpose in copyright law.
The Supreme Court adopted a new limitation on contributory
infringement in copyright law by declaring that “the sale of copying
equipment, like the sale of other articles of commerce, does not constitute contributory infringement if the product is widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable purposes. Indeed, it need merely be capa70
ble of substantial noninfringing uses.” The Supreme Court applied
this limitation and determined that since the Betamax VTR was capable of substantial noninfringing uses, Sony could not be held liable as
71
a contributory infringer.
C. Napster
As time went by, consumers’ means of copying advanced. In the
late 1990s, Napster introduced the public to peer-to-peer file-sharing,
thereby allowing users to directly connect to other users’ hard drives
and download copies of other users’ files directly onto their own hard
72
drives. The majority of the files shared over Napster were unauthorized copies of copyrighted music files, enabling millions of users to
73
become copyright infringers. The record companies feared that this
mass infringement, due to the ability of Napster’s users to download
free music from the Internet, would result in a decline in record sales
74
and a tremendous loss of profit. This fear drove members of the record industry to file suit against Napster, claiming both contributory

66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74

35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2000).
Id.
Sony, 464 U.S. at 440 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 271).
Id. at 442.
Id.
Id. at 456.
See Carroll, supra note 3, at 11–12.
Id. at 13.
Id.
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and vicarious liability for copyright infringement. The United States
District Court for the Northern District of California granted an injunction in favor of the record companies, but the Ninth Circuit
temporarily stayed the preliminary injunction until hearing the ap76
peal.
On appeal the Ninth Circuit addressed the extent of Napster’s
liability for the copyright infringement of its customers under the
77
theories of vicarious and contributory infringement. Since direct
78
infringement is required for any finding of secondary infringement,
the court first affirmed the district court’s decision that the users
were direct infringers because they made unauthorized copies of
79
copyrighted works. The Ninth Circuit next applied the Gershwin
“contributory” infringement test, noting that “one who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another, may be held liable as a
80
contributory infringer.” The court immediately rejected Napster’s
contention that the exception created in Sony precluded Napster
from liability as a contributory infringer because Napster was capable
81
of substantial noninfringing use. In so doing, the Ninth Circuit interpreted the Sony exception as a factor used to establish a higher
level of knowledge necessary for finding liability, not as a bar to liabil82
ity. The court found this knowledge requirement satisfied, despite
the fact that Napster was capable of noninfringing use because “Napster ha[d] actual knowledge that specific infringing material [was]
available using its system, that it could block access to the system by
suppliers of the infringing material, and that it failed to remove the
83
material.”
The Ninth Circuit also found that Napster materially
contributed to the infringing activities of its users because it supplied

75

A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. (Napster I), 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 900 (N.D.
Cal. 2000), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
76
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. (Napster II), 239 F.3d 1004, 1011 (9th Cir.
2001).
77
Id.
78
NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 9, § 12.04[A][3][a].
79
See Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1014–19. The Ninth Circuit dismissed Napster’s alleged defense of fair use because the purpose and character of the use was commercial, the copyrighted works were creative in nature, the whole work was copied, and
the market was harmed by the use. Id.
80
Id. at 1019 (quoting Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc.,
443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971)).
81
Id. at 1020.
82
See id. at 1020–21.
83
Id. at 1022.
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the software and the central server, thereby providing “the site and
84
facilities” allowing the users to directly infringe.
The Ninth Circuit next addressed vicarious liability—specifically
whether or not Napster “ha[d] the right and ability to supervise the
infringing activity and also ha[d] a direct financial interest in such ac85
tivities.” The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s determination that Napster financially benefited from the fact that the number
of copyrighted works available on its system increased directly with
86
the number of registered users on its system. The Ninth Circuit also
affirmed the district court’s determination that Napster had the ability to block certain users’ access to the system, and to police for infringement, despite the inability to read the content of the files being
87
transferred. This supported the conclusion that Napster could su88
pervise for infringement. The court concluded that “Napster’s failure to police the system’s ‘premises’ combined with a showing that
Napster financially benefit[ed] from the continuing availability of infringing files on its system, leads to the imposition of vicarious liabil89
ity.”
Although Napster attempted to remain in operation while
complying with the orders of the court, it was unable to survive and
90
filed for bankruptcy in June 2002.
D. The Next Generation of Peer-to-Peer File-Sharing Networks
As secondary liability in copyright law developed, so did peer-topeer technology, and although Napster disappeared as a means of
91
obtaining free copyrighted files, new peer-to-peer networks arose.
Many of these networks used knowledge gained from the Napster decision concerning which features made Napster liable for contribu92
tory and secondary infringement to avoid similar fates. In April
2003, the United States District Court for the Central District of California determined that some peer-to-peer file-sharing networks,
84

Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1022 (quoting Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76
F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1996)).
85
Id. (quoting Gershwin, 443 F.2d at 1162).
86
Id. at 1023. This was a tenuous argument because Napster was actually not
earning money. See Carroll, supra note 3, at 25. The only money coming in was investment capital, but the court equated the size of the user base with the amount of
money Napster would be able to make in the future. Id.
87
Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1024.
88
Id.
89
Id. at 1023–24.
90
See Squatriglia, supra note 6.
91
See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd. (Grokster II), 380 F.3d
1154, 1158–60 (9th Cir. 2004), vacated, 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005).
92
Id.
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namely Grokster and StreamCast, were not liable for either contribu93
tory infringement or vicarious infringement of copyrights. On ap94
peal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed this decision. Although all peer-topeer networks allow their users to download copies of copyrighted
works, the court found that there were certain differences between
Napster and the Grokster and StreamCast systems that insulated
Grokster and StreamCast from both contributory and vicarious liability. The district court acknowledged that “[d]efendants may have intentionally structured their businesses to avoid secondary liability for
copyright infringement, while benefiting financially from the illicit
draw of their wares,” but whether it was intentional or not, these peerto-peer networks fell outside the scope of the law for secondary liabil95
ity.
The Ninth Circuit first established the distinguishing features of
96
these peer-to-peer networks.
The essential difference between a
secondarily liable network and an immune network was the location
97
of the indices of the files that were available for download. The
Napster network was liable as a contributory and vicarious infringer
98
because it stored the information on Napster’s own servers. In contrast, the network used by Grokster used individual users’ computers
99
to store the system’s indices, while StreamCast used a network that
was completely decentralized and allowed users to directly search the
100
Without a central server
files available on fellow users’ computers.
with an index of all the files available for download, there was noth101
ing for StreamCast to own or operate. This lack of physical control
over the servers distinguishes the Grokster and StreamCast networks
102
from Napster.
The Ninth Circuit next examined how this distinction affected
these peer-to-peer file-sharing networks’ liability as contributory and
103
In addressing whether or not there was convicarious infringers.
93

Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. (Grokster I), 259 F. Supp.
2d 1029, 1035–46 (C.D. Cal. 2003), aff’d, 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004), vacated, 125
S. Ct. 2764 (2005).
94
Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1157.
95
Grokster I, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1046.
96
Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1158–59.
97
Id.
98
Id. at 1159.
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
Id.
102
Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1159.
103
Id. at 1160.
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tributory infringement, the Ninth Circuit recognized there was no
104
Turning
dispute over the fact that there was direct infringement.
toward the knowledge requirement, the court stated how the Sony decision impacted the knowledge requirement of Napster:
If the product at issue is not capable of substantial or commercially significant noninfringing uses, then the copyright owner
need only show that the defendant had constructive knowledge of
the infringement. On the other hand, if the product at issue is
capable of substantial or commercially significant noninfringing
uses, then the copyright owner must demonstrate that the defendant had reasonable knowledge of specific infringing files and
105
failed to act on that knowledge to prevent infringement.

The Ninth Circuit concluded that the district court was correct in its
determination that each defendant’s product was capable of substan106
tial noninfringing uses.
Therefore, the copyright holders must
show that Grokster and StreamCast had reasonable knowledge of the
107
direct infringement committed by their users.
The Ninth Circuit
also affirmed the district court’s finding that in order to fulfill the
knowledge requirement, Grokster and StreamCast must have known
108
about the infringement when they were in a position to stop it.
Since they both utilized decentralized indexing networks, which
could function without any support from either Grokster or StreamCast, once the companies learned of the infringement they no longer
109
had control over the system.
Since they were not in a position to
stop the infringement once they learned of it, the Ninth Circuit con110
cluded that the higher standard of knowledge was not met.
The Ninth Circuit next addressed whether or not the conduct of
Grokster and StreamCast qualified as materially contributing to the
111
infringement of their users.
In Napster, the Ninth Circuit found a
material contribution because Napster provided the “site and facilities” for infringement by providing centralized indices. Since neither
104

Id. At the district court level, both parties stipulated to the plaintiffs’ ownerships of the copyrights. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. (Grokster
I), 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1034 (C.D. Cal. 2003), aff’d, 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004),
vacated, 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005). The court considered that users of the service
download copyrighted music and infringe the copyright owner’s right to reproduction to be uncontroverted facts. Id.
105
Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1161.
106
Id. at 1161–62.
107
Id. at 1162.
108
Id. at 1162–63.
109
Id.
110
Id. at 1162.
111
Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1163.
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Grokster nor StreamCast provided centralized servers, the Ninth Cir112
cuit found they did not materially contribute to the infringement.
Once the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision that
there was no contributory infringement, the Ninth Circuit considered
113
whether or not there had been vicarious infringement.
Since the
presence of the elements of direct infringement and financial benefit
114
were not disputed, the only element necessary for vicarious infringement that the court addressed was the “right and ability to su115
pervise.”
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court in its
finding that neither Grokster nor StreamCast had the right and abil116
In Napster, the
ity to supervise their users’ direct infringement.
court found that Napster had a right and ability to supervise “because
it controlled the central indices of files, users were required to register with Napster, and access to the system depended on the validity of
117
a user’s registration.” Neither Grokster nor StreamCast had a central indexing system, required their users to register, or maintained
any control over whether or not any particular user had access to the
118
system.
Therefore, the Ninth Circuit concluded, unlike Napster,
neither Grokster nor StreamCast had the right and ability to super119
Since this requirement for vicarious copyright infringement
vise.
was not present, the Ninth Circuit determined that Grokster and
120
StreamCast were not liable as vicarious infringers.
The Ninth Circuit concluded its opinion with a reminder that it is not the court’s
job to alter the law in the area of copyright, rather, that should be left
121
to Congress.
E. The Inducing Infringement of Copyrights Act of 2004
In June of 2004, Congress attempted to alter the law of copyright. Senators Orrin Hatch, Patrick Leahy, Bill Frist, Tom Daschle,
Lindsey Graham and Barbara Boxer introduced an amendment to
the Copyright Act, entitled “Inducing Infringement of Copyrights Act
122
of 2004.”
The Senators wanted to hold liable as an infringer any112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122

Id.
Id. at 1164.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1165.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 1164–66.
Id. at 1167.
S. 2560, 108th Cong. (2004).
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123

one who intentionally induced another to infringe a copyright. On
July 22, 2004, the Senate Judiciary Committee held a hearing on
“Protecting Innovation and Art while Preventing Piracy,” to discuss
124
the proposed legislation.
Although the proposed bill received immense support from the Recording Industry Association of America
and other copyright holders, it met stiff opposition from fair use
125
groups, prompting Hatch and Leahy to request alternate drafts.
126
The bill was scheduled for mark-up several times, but it was continually postponed in an effort to get all sides to agree on a proposed
draft. After intense negotiation, the talks ceased on October 7, 2004,
127
and the session of Congress ended without the bill passing. Despite
this failure, Senator Hatch announced plans to reintroduce the bill.
The Supreme Court’s Decision in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios
Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.

F.

A reintroduction of the Induce Act became unnecessary on June
27, 2005 when the Supreme Court delivered a unanimous decision in
128
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. The Supreme Court
overturned the Ninth Circuit’s holding that Grokster and StreamCast
were not secondarily liable for copyright infringement committed by
129
users.
While such a determination would be extremely important
to both copyright holders and innovators under any circumstances,
the magnitude of this opinion lies in the fact that the Supreme Court
130
created liability for inducing infringement of a copyright.
In the
opinion, Justice Souter stated: “[w]e adopt [the inducement rule of
patent law] here, holding that one who distributes a device with the
123

Id.
Hearings, supra note 1, available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id
=1276&wit_id=2629.
125
Patrick Ross, Fair Use Groups Offer Alternative to Inducement Bill, CONSUMER
ELECTRONICS DAILY, Aug. 26, 2004, available at LEXIS, News Library.
126
Markup is defined as “[a] session of a congressional committee during which a
bill is revised and put into final form before it is reported to the appropriate house.”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 992 (8th ed. 2004).
127
See Brodsky, supra note 22.
128
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. (Grokster III), 125 S. Ct.
2764 (2005). Justice Souter delivered the opinion of the court, while Justice Ginsberg filed a concurrence which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy joined.
Id. at 2783 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). In addition, Justice Breyer filed a separate
concurrence which Justice Stevens and Justice O’Connor joined. Id. at 2787 (Breyer,
J., concurring). The concurrences address the status of the Sony doctrine which Justice Souter felt was unnecessary to the Court’s holding in the case. Id. at 2778 (majority opinion).
129
Grokster III, 125 S. Ct. at 2783.
130
Id. at 2780.
124
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object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear
expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is
131
liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties.”
Justice Souter began the decision by establishing that “one who
distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe a
copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps
taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of in132
fringement by third parties.” The first portion of the opinion established the background. Justice Souter initially described the technology behind Grokster and StreamCast, which was critical to the Ninth
133
Circuit’s decision.
Justice Souter next recounted the activities of
Grokster and StreamCast immediately following the downfall of Napster, and the steps each network took to attract Napster’s users
134
searching for a new way to download copyrighted songs for free.
Justice Souter considered the activities of both peer-to-peer networks
as evidence of an intention to create software to illegally download
135
copyrighted works. Finally, Justice Souter recounted how both the
district court and the Ninth Circuit found Grokster and StreamCast
136
not liable for the infringement of their users. Justice Souter recognized that this was a case about the tension between copyright protection and promoting innovation, and that the argument for imposing
137
secondary liability is powerful.
Since the Sony decision was the most recent time the Supreme
Court addressed secondary liability for copyright infringement, and it
was that case upon which MGM based its claim, Justice Souter found
it necessary to recount that earlier holding. He stated that in Sony the
“Court addressed a claim that secondary liability for infringement can
138
arise from the very distribution of a commercial product.”
Justice
Souter explained the VCR technology that was at issue and stated that
the only way to impose liability was through Sony’s knowledge that
139
some customers would infringe. In Sony the Court adopted the staple-article of commerce doctrine which in application, “absolves the
equivocal conduct of selling an item with substantial lawful as well as
unlawful uses, and limits liability to instances of more acute fault than
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139

Id.
Id. at 2770.
Id. at 2770–71.
Id. at 2772–74.
Grokster III, 125 S. Ct. at 2774.
Id. at 2774–75.
Id. at 2775.
Id. at 2777.
Id.
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the mere understanding that some of one’s products will be mis140
used.” Justice Souter agreed with MGM that the Ninth Circuit misapplied this holding by reading the rule too broadly and concluding
that being capable of substantial noninfringing use insulates the producer from liability “even when an actual purpose to cause infringing
use is shown by evidence independent of design and distribution of
the product, unless the distributors had ‘specific knowledge of infringement at a time at which they contributed to the infringement,
141
and failed to act upon that information.’”
Justice Souter found it sufficient to note that the lower courts
misapplied Sony, and declined to delineate a specific point at which
noninfringing use is no longer considered substantial, therefore trig142
gering liability.
Justice Souter declared that the pertinent rule in
Sony was the limitation it placed upon a court’s ability to impute intent for secondary liability solely from the characteristics of a product. He believed, in the current case, there was no need to impute
intent solely from the characteristics of a product, and declared
“where evidence goes beyond a product’s characteristics or the
knowledge that it may be put to infringing uses, and shows statements
or actions directed to promoting infringement, Sony’s staple-article
143
rule will not preclude liability.”
Justice Souter proceeded to explain the concept of liability for
inducing infringement as it exists in patent law, and how intent to
encourage infringement may be demonstrated through active steps
“such as advertising an infringing use or instructing how to engage in
144
an infringing use.”
Justice Souter stated that “[f]or the same reasons that Sony took the staple-article doctrine of patent law as a model
for its copyright safe-harbor rule, the inducement rule, too, is a sensi145
ble one for copyright.” Justice Souter further explained this rule by
stating that “mere knowledge of infringing potential or of actual infringing uses would not be enough to subject a distributor to liabil146
ity.” In order to find inducement, there must be “purposeful, cul147
Justice Souter then listed which
pable expression and conduct.”
actions engaged in by Grokster and StreamCast could be sufficient to
140

Id. at 2778.
Grokster III, 125 S. Ct. at 2778 (quoting Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v.
Grokster Ltd. (Grokster II), 380 F.3d 1153, 1162 (9th Cir. 2004)).
142
Id. at 2778–79.
143
Id. at 2779.
144
Id.
145
Id. at 2780.
146
Id.
147
Grokster III, 125 S. Ct. at 2780.
141
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148

constitute intent.
Justice Souter next explained that actual infringement by others, in addition to intent, is necessary for a finding
of inducement, and that in this case there was an abundance of evidence to support actual infringement by the users of Grokster and
149
StreamCast.
III. CONCERNS SPURRED BY THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN
METRO-GOLDWYN-MAYER STUDIOS INC. V. GROKSTER, LTD.
Despite the Supreme Court’s unanimous decision in Grokster,
there are many unanswered questions. Gary Shapiro, CEO of the
Consumer Electronics Association described the decision as
150
151
“murky” and providing “massive uncertainty.”
As far as what inducement and infringement mean, Grokster attorney Michael Page
stated that the decision provides “a whole bunch of conflicting signals
152
and standards.”
Another concern raised is the lack of clarity on
153
what constitutes intent, and the flood of litigation which could en154
Notwithstanding these concerns from the technology side,
sue.
Fred von Lohmann, from the Electronic Frontier Foundation is
“hopeful that when evidence is presented in the Cal. court, the judge
should realize that the P2P networks have not violated the Supreme
155
Court’s new test.”
The most apparent uncertainty to emerge from Grokster is the interpretation of the Sony decision. While supporters praised the Court
156
for affirming the Sony decision, the Court actually left that decision

148

Id. at 2780–82.
Id. at 2782.
150
Paul Sweeting, Supreme Court Hands Hollywood Huge Win in Ruling Against Grokster, Streamcast, VIDEO BUS., July 4, 2005, at 7, available at 2005 WLNR 10640244.
151
Andrew Noyes & Greg Piper, High Court Rules Against File-Sharing Networks,
WASH. INTERNET DAILY, June 28, 2005, available at LEXIS, News Library.
152
Id.
153
Press Release, Consumer Electronics Assoc., CEA Expresses Concerns over Supreme Court Grokster Ruling; Decision Decreases Legal Clarity While Increasing
Likelihood of Litigation; Intent Test Establishes High Burden for Manufacturers and
Entrepreneurs (June 28, 2005), available at LEXIS, News Library.
154
Jonathan M. Holda, Commentary: Grokster Provides No Bright Line Rule: Welcome
to Copyright Law, DAILY REC. (Baltimore, MD), July 1, 2005, available at LEXIS, News
Library.
155
High Court Rules Against File-Sharing Networks, CONSUMER ELECTRONICS DAILY,
June 28, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 10135301.
156
Press Release, Home Recording Rights Coalition, HRRC - Concerned Over
Grokster “Inducement” Rule, Encouraged on Betamax and Home Taping; Intent
Standard Seems Narrow; Burden of Proof High (June 27, 2005), available at LEXIS,
News Library.
149
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157

untouched.
In fact, the unanimous court filed two concurring
opinions on the issue of the Sony doctrine with three Justices support158
ing each concurrence. In Justice Ginsburg’s concurrence, in which
Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justice Kennedy join, she was concerned
with what the Sony Court intended by “substantial noninfringing
159
use.” Justice Ginsburg did not believe that the “anecdotal evidence
of noninfringing uses” proffered by Grokster was sufficient to satisfy
160
the requirements of Sony. Justice Ginsburg emphasized the importance of the proportion of noninfringing uses to infringing uses, and
found that one of the reasons the Ninth Circuit was incorrect in its
analysis of the Sony doctrine was its finding that the noninfringing
161
uses that existed for Grokster and StreamCast were substantial.
Justice Breyer wrote his concurrence, in which Justice Stevens
and Justice O’Connor joined, in order to disagree with the concur162
rence of Justice Ginsburg. Justice Breyer maintained that the percentage of noninfringing use that was necessary in Sony to be considered substantial was about 9 percent, a figure which is very close to
163
the 10 percent he asserted was present in Grokster.
Justice Breyer
also stressed the importance of the word “capable” in the Sony decision, and that the Court did not require the product to currently
have substantial noninfringing use, but rather that it was capable of
164
substantial noninfringing use. Justice Breyer utilized the rest of the
concurrence to explain why altering the Sony rule, as he believes Justice Ginsburg suggests it ought to be, would be bad from a policy per165
spective.
IV. THE APPARENT UNCERTAINTIES RAISED BY THIS DECISION
ARE RESOLVED IF THE COURTS APPLY THE DECISION IN
CONJUNCTION WITH PATENT LAW PRINCIPLES
Most of the concerns regarding the uncertainties of Grokster, including those expressed by the Supreme Court, can be resolved by
looking to patent law where the Court admittedly derived the doctrine of inducing infringement. Additionally, the Supreme Court has
157

Holda, supra note 154.
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. (Grokster III), 125 S. Ct.
2764, 2769 (2005).
159
See id. at 2784 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
160
Id. at 2785.
161
Id. at 2785–86.
162
Id. at 2787 (Breyer, J., concurring).
163
Id. at 2789.
164
Grokster III, 125 S. Ct. at 2789 (Breyer J., concurring).
165
Id. at 2791–95.
158
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acknowledged that when “[t]he closest analogy is provided by the patent law cases . . . it is appropriate to refer [to them] because of the
166
historic kinship between patent law and copyright law.” Therefore,
since Grokster is the first application of inducing infringement in
copyright law, where the opinion is not explicitly clear, it is appropriate to refer to the application of the inducing infringement of patent
statute.
A. Concern over the Murky Standard of What Infringement Means
There is concern that the Supreme Court was not clear about
the necessary elements of inducing infringement liability. Although
Justice Souter did not explicitly lay out the factors necessary for find167
ing liability, the decision is far from “massive[ly] uncertain[].” Justice Souter’s three page discussion of the evidence which exists
168
against Grokster and StreamCast concerning intent, as well as his
169
use of the phrase “in addition to intent,” make it clear that intent is
a necessary element. The other required element is “actual in170
fringement by recipients of the device.” Regardless of explicit identification in the decision, Justice Souter declared that the Court was
171
adopting the inducing infringement rule from patent law.
Therefore, it is appropriate to look to patent law for guidance. In patent
law the courts require three elements to be present for a finding of
172
inducing infringement: direct infringement, knowledge, and intent.
In both patent and copyright law, the requirement of direct infringement is a common element for any finding of secondary liabil173
ity, and the courts have read the elements of intent and knowledge
174
into the statute, despite an explicit requirement in the Patent Act.
In applying the rule presented by the Court in Grokster, the courts will
require both actual infringement and intent because they are explic166

Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439 (1984). See
also John Shepard Wiley, Jr., Copyright at the School of Patent, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 119,
137–44 (1991).
167
Noyes & Piper, supra note 151.
168
Grokster III, 125 S. Ct. at 2780–82.
169
Id. at 2782.
170
Id.
171
Id. at 2780.
172
CHISUM, supra note 30, § 17.04.
173
See supra Part II.A.ii (noting that direct infringement is required for vicarious
liability and contributory liability in copyright law and for contributory liability and
inducing infringement in patent law).
174
Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1469 (Fed. Cir.
1990); Water Techs. Corp. v. Calco, Ltd., 850 F.2d 660, 668 (Fed. Cir. 1988); CHISUM,
supra note 30, §17.04.
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itly stated, but the courts should also look to patent law and require
knowledge.
In applying § 271(b), the inducing infringement of patent statute, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit recognized that
“[a]lthough section 271(b) does not use the word ‘knowing,’ the case
175
law and legislative history uniformly assert such a requirement,” and
that “a person infringes by actively and knowingly aiding and abetting
176
The alleged infringer must have
another’s direct infringement.”
knowledge that the acts are inducing infringement; mere knowledge
177
of the acts does not sufficiently satisfy the knowledge requirement.
When applying the inducing infringement of copyright rule as
presented by the Supreme Court in Grokster, the courts should adopt
a knowledge requirement similar to the one adopted by the Federal
Circuit in patent law. Reading this requirement in would alleviate
some fears of murkiness because the courts would recognize, like
the Federal Circuit, that “[t]he plaintiff has the burden of showing
that . . . he knew or should have known his actions would induce ac178
tual infringements.”
B. Concern that Lack of Clarity of Intent Could Cause Ruinous
Litigation
Some critics of the Grokster decision are concerned that the Supreme Court was not clear on the standard of intent, and that this
could lead members of the content industry to bring excessive law179
suits.
Although the Supreme Court did not devote much time to
the general standard of intent, Justice Souter made it clear that the
level of intent necessary is the intent to cause infringement. Justice
Souter explained that liability will exist if “one . . . distributes a de180
vice with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright.”
The technology industry should be pleased that the Supreme Court
established this elevated level of intent because when the courts apply

175

Water Techs., 850 F.2d at 668 (citing CHISUM, supra note 30, at § 17.04).
Id.
177
Ferguson Beauregard/Logic Controls v. Mega Sys., LLC, 350 F.3d 1327, 1342
(Fed. Cir. 2003) (citing Micro Chem., Inc. v. Great Plains Chem. Co., 194 F.3d 1250
(Fed. Cir. 1999)).
178
Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 553 (Fed. Cir.
1990).
179
See William Triplett, Grokster Tuned Out, DAILY VARIETY, June 28, 2005, at 1,
available at 2005 WLNR 10197971.
180
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. (Grokster III), 125 S. Ct.
2764, 2780 (2005).
176
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the inducing infringement statute in patent law, on which this rule is
181
based, they do not uniformly apply a high level of intent.
In different circumstances, the Federal Circuit applies different
182
standards for the requisite level of intent. In 1990, the Federal Circuit held in Manville Sales Corp., that “[i]t must be established that the
defendant possessed specific intent to encourage another’s infringe183
ment.”
The Federal Circuit has not maintained this high level of
184
In Hewlett-Packard
intent as the standard throughout its decisions.
185
Co., which was decided three months prior to Manville Sales Corp.,
the Federal Circuit held the level of intent necessary for inducing infringement is only the “intent to cause the acts which constitute the
186
infringement.”
Since these decisions, the Federal Circuit has util187
ized both specific intent to induce infringement, and the lower
standard which is intent to cause the act that constitutes infringe188
ment.
While it is clear that the level of intent necessary for a finding of
inducing infringement of a copyright is high, there is still concern
over how a court will determine whether intent is present. The Supreme Court did spend time describing the specific activity engaged
in by Grokster and StreamCast that it felt displayed the necessary in189
tent. In addition, Justice Souter listed which activities would not be
sufficient, such as mere knowledge of the infringement, as well as
“ordinary acts incident to product distribution, such as offering cus190
tomers technical support or product updates.” The Supreme Court
also held that intent may be shown through clear expression. The
Court provided substantial guidance on how to determine what constitutes intent, but also intentionally left it somewhat undefined. The
Supreme Court allowed for “other affirmative steps taken to foster in-

181

CHISUM, supra note 30, § 17.04.
Id.
183
Manville Sales, 917 F.2d at 553. “Specific Intent” is defined as “[t]he intent to
accomplish the precise criminal act that one is later charged with.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 826 (8th ed. 2004).
184
CHISUM, supra note 30, § 17.04.
185
Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 1464 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
186
Id. at 1469.
187
Ferguson Beauregard/Logic Controls v. Mega Sys., LLC, 350 F.3d 1327, 1342
(Fed. Cir. 2003).
188
Moba, B.V. v. Diamond Automation, Inc., 325 F.3d 1306, 1318 (Fed. Cir.
2003).
189
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. (Grokster III), 125 S. Ct.
2764, 2780–82 (2005).
190
Id. at 2780.
182
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191

fringement.” This standard is similar to the standard used in evaluating liability for inducing infringement of a patent, where the courts
192
Permitting a court to infer intent grants more
may infer intent.
discretion to the courts and allows a more fact sensitive analysis.
The ability to infer intent does not mean courts have no guidance, they may look to patent law where there is precedent for inferring intent. In patent law it is not necessary to have direct evidence
in order to prove inducement, but rather “circumstantial evidence
193
may suffice,” and “[t]he requisite intent to induce infringement
194
The Court of Apmay be inferred from all of the circumstances.”
peals for the Federal Circuit has established guidelines for inferring
195
intent.
One of these guidelines is the requirement of an affirmative
196
197
act. In Tegal Corp. v. Tokyo Electron Co., Ltd., a parent company escaped liability for a subsidiary’s infringement because the Federal
Circuit held that failure to prevent infringement was not induce198
ment. The Federal Circuit stated that “[i]n the absence of a showing of control over another party, merely permitting that party to
199
commit infringing acts does not constitute infringement,” and “evi200
dence of mere inaction [does] not constitute inducement.”
The
191

Id.
Water Techs. Corp. v. Calco, Ltd., 850 F.2d 660, 669 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
193
Id. at 668.
194
Id. at 669. The Federal Circuit applied this standard in Snuba International, Inc.
v. Dolphin World, Inc., No. 99-1357, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 16946, at *18 (Fed. Cir. July
11, 2000). Snuba owned a patent for a method for diving without air tanks strapped
to the body. Id. at *2. Dolphin World manufactured air tanks that were not strapped
to the body. Dolphin World provided promotional material containing instructions
on how to use its product in a way consistent with the method for which Snuba
owned a patent, and thus, was infringing. Id. at *2–3. The Federal Circuit considered instructions on how to infringe, although supplied separately from the product,
in combination with supplying the product, sufficient to infer the necessary intent
for inducing infringement liability. Id. at *18.
195
CHISUM, supra note 30, § 17.04[3].
196
See Tegal Corp. v. Tokyo Electron Co., Ltd., 248 F.3d 1376, 1380 (Fed. Cir.
2001).
197
248 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Tegal had an injunction against Tokyo Electron America, Inc. (TEA), preventing the corporation from inducing its subsidiaries
to infringe Tegal’s patents. Id. at 1377. After the injunction had issued, one of the
companies that TEA owned directly infringed one of Tegal’s patents, and Tegal
claimed that this violated the injunction because TEA induced. Id. Since TEA did
not take any action to get the subsidiary to infringe, the court did not infer intent.
Id. at 1380.
198
Id. at 1380.
199
Id. at 1378.
200
Tegal, 248 F.3d at 1379 (citing A. Stucki Co. v. Worthington Indus., Inc., 849
F.2d 593, 597 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
192
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Federal Circuit noted that a defendant cannot be held liable for fail201
ure to take legal action against the party it is allegedly inducing. In
Tegal, the Federal Circuit held that in order to find a defendant liable
for inducing infringement, the defendant must commit an affirma202
tive act.
Another patent case that is helpful in determining the presence
of intent is Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts, Inc. v. Cardinal Industries,
203
Inc.
In that case, advertising satisfied the requirement of an af204
firmative step to infer intent.
In Chiuminatta, the court found the
manufacturers of a saw liable for inducing infringement of a patent
205
by inferring intent through advertisement. Since the saw could perform an infringing function and the advertisement notified the consumers of this fact, the court found Cardinal liable for inducing in206
fringement.
If a manufacturer conveys to the consumer the
possible infringing use of either an infringing or an innocent product, through advertising, labels, or instructions, he could be held li207
able for inducing infringement of a patent.
Donald S. Chisum, a
leading authority on patents, noted that “[e]ven an express warning
to customers against infringing use will not preclude liability if under
208
the circumstances the warning invites such use.”
If a court interpreting the new inducing infringement of copyright rule adopts these limitations on inferring intent, it would minimize the concern over frivolous litigation. A copyright holder would
have an indication by looking at patent law of what may or may not
constitute the requisite intent for infringement, and would only invest in lawsuits where a court is likely to find inducement.
C. The Fate of the Sony Decision
In Grokster, a case concerned with establishing a new standard of
liability in copyright law, much is made by the Justices of what should
201

Id. at 1380.
Id. at 1378, 1380.
203
145 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
204
Id. at 1312.
205
Id. In this case, Cardinal manufactured a saw that cut through concrete, while
Chiuminatta held a patent for the process of cutting through concrete at a certain
hardness. Id. at 1305–06. In advertisements by Cardinal, it informed customers that
they could use the saw to cut through concrete at a hardness that the patent did not
protect. Id. Cardinal conceded, however, that the saw would cut through that level
and beyond, therefore encompassing the hardness the patent protected. Id.
206
Id.
207
CHISUM, supra note 30, §17.04[4][F].
208
Id.
202
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be done with an old rule of copyright law. Both the new standard,
inducing infringement, and the old rule, the staple-article doctrine
from the Sony decision, are ideas borrowed from patent law. It appears the Justices’ concerns are unnecessary.
Patent law has proven not only that the staple-article doctrine
and the concept of inducing infringement are capable of coexist209
ing, but that the staple-article doctrine provides an appropriate
limitation on secondary liability. The language that the Supreme
Court adopted in the Sony decision was taken directly from 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(c), the contributory infringement section of the Patent Act,
which is immediately preceded by § 271(b), the inducing infringement section of the Patent Act, which the Court adopted in the Grok210
ster decision.
Justice Souter described the current understanding of the Sony
rule as limiting “imputing culpable intent as a matter of law from the
211
characteristics or uses of a distributed product.” This means that if
a product is capable of a noninfringing use, and there is no other
evidence that the distributor was intending to induce infringement,
212
the distributor cannot be liable. The application of the Sony rule by
Justice Souter is the application of the staple-article doctrine that the
Federal Circuit utilizes.
There are several cases in patent law which demonstrate that the
current application of the staple-article doctrine, in conjunction with
the inducing infringement rule, is successful in catching infringers,
while still being effective in limiting liability to manufactures which
intend to induce infringement. The Federal Circuit, in Fina Research,
213
S.A. v. Baroid Ltd., makes it clear that even if a product is deemed a
staple article, that does not explicitly provide protection from induc214
ing infringement liability.
In its analysis, the Federal Circuit ac-

209

35 U.S.C. § 271 (2000).
Id.
211
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. (Grokster III), 125 S. Ct.
2764, 2779 (2005).
212
See id.
213
141 F.3d 1479 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
214
Id. at 1482. Fina was a chemical company that made and sold FINAGREEN, a
product used in drilling for oil and as an ingredient in drilling muds. Id. at 1480.
Baroid owned the patent for these drilling muds and claimed that Fina infringed and
induced infringement of its patent because customers that used FINAGREEN to
make the drilling muds infringed the patent. Id. The court held that Fina could be
held liable for inducing infringement, but not for direct infringement because, at
most, FINAGREEN satisfied only one element of the drilling mud patents, which
contained multi-element claims. Id. at 1481–82. Further, the court explained that
210
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knowledged that with inducing infringement, the fact that the infringing article is a “staple article or commodity of commerce suitable
215
for substantial noninfringing use” does not protect the defendant
216
from liability. Despite the fact that a staple-article is not completely
insulated from liability, it still protects legitimate manufacturers.
217
In Oak Industries, Inc. v. Zenith Electronics Corp., the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois examined
the liability of a manufacturer whose product had several uses, all of
218
which were noninfringing except one.
The court found that in a
case such as this, whether or not the manufacturer is liable for inducing infringement hinges on whether or not the requisite level of in219
tent is present. The court noted that “a jury could find that Zenith
actually induced infringement . . . by adding extra shielding . . . to
220
eliminate direct pickup interference;” however, “if the jury found
that the shielding was necessary for the converters to perform the
unpatented methods, then any infringement would be incidental to
221
the performance of other functions,” and Zenith would not be liable. If the product is a staple-article and its capacity to infringe a
copyright is incidental and necessary to its ability to perform its other
noninfringing functions, the intent element for inducing infringe222
ment will not be met, and there can be no liability.

because FINAGREEN was capable of a noninfringing use, Fina could not be held liable for contributory infringement. Id.
215
Fina Research, 141 F.3d at 1482–83 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 271(c)).
216
Id. at 1482.
217
726 F. Supp. 1525 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
218
Id. at 1539–44. Zenith created a cable converter box that performed several
functions such as tuning, decoding, and descrambling. Id. at 1529. The housing
around the box had a shielding that prevented direct interference, a method patented by Oak Industries. Id. Zenith argued that the converter boxes used the same
hardware to perform the infringing function of preventing interference and noninfringing function of housing the box, and that the infringement was not intentional.
Id. at 1538.
219
Id. at 1542.
220
Oak Indus., 726 F. Supp. at 1542 n.12.
221
Id. at 1542.
222
See id.
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Additionally, in Warner-Lambert Co. v. Apotex Corp., the drug
company was not liable when two percent of consumers used the
drug in an infringing manner while the remaining ninety-eight per224
cent did not infringe.
The Federal Circuit held that “[e]specially
where a product has substantial noninfringing uses, intent to induce
infringement cannot be inferred even when the defendant has actual
knowledge that some users of its product may be infringing the pat225
ent.”
When analyzing the Sony rule and what its current and future
application should be, the courts should look to patent law. There,
an exact determination of what amount of noninfringing use constitutes a substantial amount, which is the focus of both concurrences in
Grokster, is not the important aspect of the doctrine. What the staplearticle doctrine brings to patent law, and what the Sony rule brings to
copyright law, is a check on the ability of the courts to presume intent. Under the current understanding, the exact percentage of use
that is noninfringing is irrelevant as long as there is other evidence of
intent to induce infringement.
V. CONCLUSION
Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Grokster, copyright law
permitted two ways to hold a defendant liable for infringement by
226
another: vicarious and contributory liability.
The courts were unsuccessful in utilizing either form of secondary liability to hold the
current peer-to-peer file-sharing networks liable for the infringement
227
of users.
Congress introduced the “Inducing Infringement of
Copyright Act of 2004” as an alternative means of secondary liability
228
Unfortunately the congresto hold peer-to-peer networks liable.
229
sional session expired before any action was taken on the bill. On

223

316 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Apotex is a drug company that owned patents
for various uses of its drugs. Id. at 1351–53. A small percentage of doctors began
prescribing one of Apotex’s drugs for a use in a way that not only differed from a
method for which Apotex owned a patent, but also infringed a Warner-Lambert patent. Id. The court held that although Apotex may have known about the infringing
use, the use was not approved by the FDA, it was only used in an infringing way about
two percent of the time, and therefore, the evidence was insufficient to infer intent.
Id. at 1365–66.
224
Id. at 1365.
225
Id.
226
See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
227
See supra Part II.D.
228
See supra notes 124–25 and accompanying text.
229
See supra note 126–27 and accompanying text.
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June 27, 2005 the Supreme Court issued a decision in Grokster, in
230
which it adopted liability for inducing infringement of a copyright.
The Supreme Court’s decision received criticism for lacking clar231
ity. Many of the uncertainties could be resolved by examining the
decision in conjunction with the previously established principles of
inducing infringement in patent law, since that is where the Supreme
232
Court admittedly borrows the doctrine. Criticism that the Supreme
Court was too vague, in regard to the exact requirements of inducement and infringement, can be resolved through an analysis of Justice Souter’s decision in its entirety, as well as looking to patent law
which established direct infringement, intent, and knowledge as the
233
necessary requirements.
The concern over the lack of clarity of
what constitutes intent can be resolved by recognizing the guidance
Justice Souter provides, by listing specific activities which are not sufficient to constitute intent, as well as looking at patent law cases in
which the Federal Circuit provides further guidelines for finding in234
tent. The disagreement among the Justices concerning the fate of
the Sony decision can also be resolved by looking to patent law, from
which the Sony decision was originally borrowed, and where the sta235
ple-article doctrine and inducing infringement rule coexist.

230
231
232
233
234
235

See supra notes 129–30 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 150–51 and accompanying text.
See supra Part IV.A–B.
See supra Part IV.A.
See supra Part IV.B.
See supra Part IV.C.

